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Abstract
We use the Minority Game as a testing frame for the problem of the emergence of
diversity in socio-economic systems. For the MG with heterogeneous impacts, we show
that the direct generalization of the usual agents’ profit does not fit some real-world
situations. As a typical example we use the traffic formulation of the MG. Taking into
account vehicles of various lengths it can easily happen that one of the roads is crowded
by a few long trucks and the other contains more drivers but still is less covered by
vehicles. Most drivers are in the shorter queue, so the majority win. To describe such
situations, we generalized the formula for agents’ profit by explicitly introducing utility
function depending on an agent’s impact. Then, the overall profit of the system may
become positive depending on the actual choice of the utility function. We investigated
several choices of the utility function and showed that this variant of the MG may turn
into a positive sum game.
Keywords: Minority Game, econophysics, stochastic processes
PACS: 89.65.-s, 05.40.-a, 05.65.+b
1. Introduction
The Minority Game (MG), introduced slightly more than a decade ago [1, 2, 3, 4, 5],
gained the reputation of an “Ising model” in the field of Econophysics [6, 7]. It is surely
an exaggeration, as the complexity of the Ising model is many orders of magnitude higher,
but nevertheless, the MG is a widely accepted framework for testing a variety of ideas in
modelling socio-economic phenomena. There are several excellent reviews [8, 9, 10, 11] of
the vast literature on the subject, which we have no intention to review again here. The
aim of our work is to contribute to understanding the possible advantages of diversity,
which may be one of the sources of the heterogeneity of agents.
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The topic of our work falls within the generalisations of the canonical MG to the case
of several different groups of agents. Perhaps the most deeply studied is the variant with
two types of agents, called producers and speculators [12, 13, 14]. The market ecology
which emerges, shows fairly clearly that the two groups need each other to gain better
efficiency. In different perspective, the agents may be divided into groups of leaders and
imitators [15, 16, 17, 18]. Here also, the performance of the system as a whole might
be increased, if the imitators are present in proper fraction. If the agents are allowed
to participate in the game or not, depending on their score [19, 20, 21, 22], the bursts
of activity reminiscent of the effect of volatility clustering are observed. Similar case
considers agents who play the game at certain fixed frequency. Their frequencies may
be broadly distributed, which induces new features into the game [23, 24, 25]. The case
of investors with different weights was investigated for a very general setup [26]. In
our work, we choose a more specific situation and show that it leads to new non-trivial
consequences.
From the following consideration it can be seen why can be the diversity helpful
in the framework of the MG. In the traffic formulation of the MG, the drivers choose
between two alternative roads and those who take the less crowded one, are the winners.
If all the vehicles have the same length, only minority of agents can be counted winners,
namely those who drive on the road with minority of drivers. However, imagine that
besides trucks, there are also small city cars. It can easily happen that one of the roads
is crowded by a few long trucks and the other contains more drivers but still is less
covered by vehicles. Most drivers are in the shorter queue, so the majority win. This is
the essence of our paper which is just mathematical elaboration of this consideration.
However, the previous simple setting does not take into account the utility of the
vehicles. In this view, the drivers could choose infinitesimally short vehicles as optimal
which clearly contradicts the real traffic situation. Indeed, the longer the car is, the
more passengers or load it can carry, obviously for the price of higher fuel consumption.
To model these considerations, we incorporated the utility of the vehicles expressed as
a function of their length. This way we included feature which favour vehicles of finite
length. Nevertheless, the ultimate motivation for the introduction of the utility function
is the optimization problem the agents face. We consider the impacts as parameters the
agents can choose to maximize their expected utility.
2. Heterogeneous groups in the MG
Generally, the MG is a model of the bounded sources allocation which is driven by
agents with bounded rationality. In the simplest setting, they do not have but two
options. In each round, they aim to choose the right action, i.e. the action chosen by
the minority of agents. Then, only the minority of agents can win for principal reasons.
To adapt to their environment, each agent has two strategies. They predict the next
optimal choice considering only a few previous results. Still, there is not any space for
an adaptation of agents as both their strategies are fixed. Therefore, each agent counts
the score of each strategy and then follow the currently better strategy.
In the urban traffic, drivers have cars of various lengths. Following this paradigm, we
assign each agent an individual impact on the game. It can be directly interpreted as the
length of the vehicle the agent is driving, however, some more ambitious interpretations
are left to the conclusion. Next, we divide the agents into several groups according the
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assigned impacts. Formally, we have G ∈ N+ groups of agents. The group g ∈ {1, . . . , G}
contains Ng agents and each of them has impact Ig ∈ R+. The total number of agents is
N =
∑G
g=1Ng and the relative size of group g will be denoted λg ≡ Ng/N . For further
convenience, we introduce the following symbol for the weighted average of an arbitrary
function vg ∈ R over all groups
[vg] ≡
G∑
g=1
λgvg . (1)
Throughout this paper, we shall refer to an actual values of the groups’ ratios {λg}g and
impacts {Ig}g as the configuration of the game. To restore the canonical MG, it suffices
to set G, λ1 and I1 equal to 1.
As usual in the MG, all agents are subject to the same external information and all of
them are able to distinguish P different information (or memory) patterns µ ∈ {1, . . . , P}.
These patterns arrive randomly with uniform probability. We stress that throughout
this paper we shall work within batch MG with uniformly distributed random memories,
i.e. all P patterns occur with equal frequency, the occurrence of patterns is uncorrelated
in time and strategies’ scores are updated only after all P patterns are used. Within
such setting we can relatively easily obtain analytical results, with no need to resort
to computer simulations. In so doing, we rely on the results of Refs. [37] and [38],
which show that MG with random uniformly chosen memories is very close, although
not identical, to the canonical MG. All important qualitative aspects are the same and
the small quantitative difference diminishes when we approach the critical point.
In sequel, we shall denote the average of a function fµ ∈ R taken over all the in-
formation patterns µ as fµ ≡ 1P
∑P
µ=1 f
µ. Next, the action prescribed by strategy
s = ±1 of i-th agent from group g, provided the information pattern is µ, is denoted by
aµ,sg,i ∈ {−1,+1}. Then, the currently executed action of an agent reads
aµg,i(t) ≡ aµ,sg,i(t)g,i (2)
where the random variable sg,i(t) is an agent’s current choice of strategy. It will be
specified in detail later on. The following combinations
ωµg,i ≡
aµ,+1g,i + a
µ,−1
g,i
2
ξµg,i ≡
aµ,+1g,i − aµ,−1g,i
2
(3)
allow us to write the aggregated action of agents from group g as
Aµg (t) ≡
Ng∑
i=1
aµg,i(t) =
Ng∑
i=1
ωµg,i + sg,i(t) ξ
µ
g,i . (4)
Next, for the overall impact of all individual actions of all agents we have
Bµ(t) ≡
G∑
g=1
IgA
µ
g (t) . (5)
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We follow the batch variant of the MG where the difference of strategies’ scores qg,i(t)
evolves as
qg,i(t+ 1)− qg,i(t) = −ξµg,iBµ(t) (6)
Note that in this definition the update of the strategies’ scores of an agent contains just
the variable ξµg,i = ±1 indicating the chosen side. The alternative updating of the score
would be proportional to the impact Ig of the agent in question. We shall discuss the
differences between these two choices later.
Now, the current strategy choice sg,i(t) of an agent is governed by the stochastic rule
Prob {sg,i(t) = ±1} = 1
2
e±Γ qg,i(t)
cosh (Γ qg,i(t))
(7)
where the parameter Γ ∈ R+ is usually named as the “learning rate”. Indeed, the higher
the value of Γ is, the more an agent trust his current knowledge represented by the value
of qg,i(t). Henceforth, we denote the mean value of any random variable x = x(sg,i(t))
with respect to the probability distribution (7) by angular brackets, 〈x〉. Especially, for
the mean value of sg,i(t) itself, we have
mg,i(t) ≡ 〈sg,i(t)〉 = tanh(Γ qg,i(t)) (8)
In what follows, we shall refer this value as magnetization in analogy to purely physical
systems.
In the next section, these magnetizations are necessary to evaluate the performances
of the agents in the MG. Optimally, we would calculate all mg,i(t) as functions of time
and made our conclusions. To ease this program a bit, we utilize here the pioneering
way the MG was firstly solved using the replica method [30, 31]. Thus, we search for the
value of mg,i(t) only at the stationary point of the game’s dynamics. Such stationary
value mg,i is defined in this manner
mg,i ≡ lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
mg,i(t) (9)
The same convention will be used also for other variables to denote their stationary value.
To find the stationary state, we observe that, for Γ→ 0, the evolution of the strategies’
scores (6) implies the following dynamics of magnetizations (8)
mg,i(t+ 1)−mg,i(t) ≃ − 1
2N
Γ
Ig
(
1−m2g,i(t)
) ∂H
∂mg,i
(10)
with the Lyapunov function
H({mg,i}g,i, {aµ,±1g,i }g,i) =
(
G∑
g=1
Ig〈Aµg 〉
)2
=
=
1
4

 G∑
g=1
Ig

 Ng∑
i=1
aµ,+g,i (1 +mg,i) + a
µ,−
g,i (1 −mg,i)




2
(11)
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which plays the role of the Hamiltonian in subsequent calculations. Next, by calculating
the arguments of the minimum of H we obtain the stationary values of mg,i.
If we make the score updates proportional to the actual impact of an agent, which
is the alternative already discussed nearby Eq. (6), the equation (10) would require a
modification. However, a short calculation reveals that the modification consists only in
missing Ig in the denominator on the right-hand side of Eq. (10). Most importantly, both
definitions result in the same Lyapunov function and further course of the calculations is
therefore identical. Thus, it does not matter whether the prescription for the dynamics
of strategies’ scores (6) is proportional to an actual impact or not. However, what does
matter, is the definition of the outcome of the game for an agent, as defined later in Eq.
(14). The choice (6) we did earlier was taken to make this definition conform with the
definition (14) (to be seen later).
In fact, the previous approach with Hamiltonian H playing the role of Lyapunov
function is not the most general. To determine the behaviour of the MG for arbitrary
Γ, there exists another path of calculations mastering stochastic calculus [32]. However,
it was shown that finite value of Γ influences the results only in the non-ergodic phase
while in the ergodic phase the results are independent of Γ. Here we investigate only the
ergodic phase, thus the limit Γ → 0 is acceptable and the use of Lyapunov function is
justified.
In the course of computations, we shall work in the thermodynamic limit of infinite
number of agents, N → ∞, keeping all group ratios λg fixed, and at the same time
limiting the number of information patterns to infinity, P →∞, holding the fraction
α ≡ P
N
(12)
fixed. This value is the principal parameter of both canonical and generalized MG.
3. The profit of agents
In this section, we have to detour from the conventional notation used in the context
of the MG. To incorporate the utility function of agents, it is better to write about their
profits instead of their losses. To establish the connection to the canonical MG, a clear
relation to volatility
σ2 ≡ 1
N
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
〈Bµ(t)2〉 , (13)
which is the usual characteristic of agents’ performance, will be derived.
First of all, we define the current outcome of an individual agent i of group g as
ρg,i(t) ≡ −
〈
aµg,i(t)B
µ(t)
〉
. (14)
It indicates whether an agent was successful in the current round of the batch MG. His
ability to obey the “join-minority imperative”, i.e. to choose aµg,i(t) = −sign(Bµ(t)) for
a typical information pattern µ, guarantees him positive outcome ρg,i(t) and the same
holds vice versa. We note that the fact that an agent’s impact Ig is not included in
formula (14) is the crucial point of our modification of the MG.
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Next, for the average outcome within the group g we have
ρg(t) ≡ 1
Ng
Ng∑
i=1
ρg,i(t) = − 1
Ng
〈Aµg (t)Bµ(t)〉 . (15)
Coming to the stationary state, we can write (the stationary value of) the overall average
outcome ρ as
ρ ≡ [ρg] (16)
To relate an average outcome within a group to an average profit of that group, we
have to take into account the utility function U(I). We follow the standard way it is
defined in classical economics. Its purpose is to quantify agents’ preferences over the
whole spectra of possible impacts [36]. In other words, the more an agent prefers impact
I, the higher value is assigned to that impact by U(I). Such utility function can be
interpreted, for instance, as the profit of an owner of the vehicle of length I. For the sake
of simplicity, we assume that the utility function is common for all agents of all groups
and non-negative. Now, we define the average profit Π
{U(I)}
g of group g provided the
utility function is U(I) in this manner
Π{U(I)}g ≡ U(Ig) ρg . (17)
Then, the overall average profit over all groups reads
Π{U(I)} ≡
[
Π{U(I)}g
]
. (18)
We note that introduction of U(I) is by no means equivalent to readjusting of the impacts.
If we consider all impacts to have the same utility, i.e. U(I) = 1, we obtain an
extremal case of profit Π{1} = ρ. On the other hand, prescribing an utility of impact
directly proportional to its size, i.e. U(I) = I, we observe Π{I} = −σ2, so the minus
volatility (13) is another extremal case of the profit defined by formula (18). Realistic
situations will lie somewhere in the middle. For example, we can choose U(I) = Id for
0 < d < 1 or U(I) = I/(I + 1). However, in the following we shall mainly compare the
extremal cases −σ2 and ρ, to better see the difference. We shall see that this shift of
focus has important implications on the conclusions we shall draw from the results of the
computations.
At the moment, we define the mutual predictability between groups f, g ∈ {1, . . . , G}
θfg ≡ N
NfNg
〈Aµf 〉〈Aµg 〉 (19)
which is a direct generalisation of the usual definition of the predictability in the canonical
MG [9]. It corresponds to the ability of group f to adapt to the aggregated attendances
Ag, and vice versa. The less the value of θfg is, the more the groups f, g are adopted to
each other as their aggregated attendances Aµf and A
µ
f are more anti-correlated. Then,
for the mean predictability of group g it holds
θg ≡ 1
N
〈Aµg 〉〈Bµ〉 = [Ifθfg] . (20)
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Its knowledge is the key ingredient in the calculation of ρg. Indeed, if we apply the
approximation
G∑
f=1
If
Ng∑
i=1
Nf∑
j=1
ξµg,i ξ
µ
f,j〈(sg,i −mg,i)(sf,j −mf,j)〉 ≃ Ig
Ng∑
i=1
(ξµg,i)
2(1−m2g,i) (21)
which is justified in the ergodic phase, see again Ref. [9], introduce the set of order
parameters for g ∈ {1, . . . , G}
Qg ≡
I2g
Ng
Ng∑
i=1
m2g,i , (22)
and compare definitions of ρg and θg, see (15) and (20), respectively, we obtain
ρg =
Qg − I2g
2Ig
− θg . (23)
At this moment, we can realise the importance of θg. It is not only a characteristic
of groups’ ability to predict the overall impact Bµ, but it is also a link connecting the
knowledge of the outcome ρg of group g to the knowledge of the minima of Hamiltonian
H . Recalling the definition of θfg, see (19), together with equation (11), we can derive
that
θfg =
1
2
N
NfNg
d2H
dIf dIg
. (24)
Thus, as soon as we know H as function of the impacts Ig, g ∈ {1, . . . , G}, we deduce
also all mean predictabilities θg for all groups using the mutual predictabilities θfg.
4. Replica solution
Whatever utility function U(I) we choose for the impact of the agents, the key el-
ements for the calculation are the average groups’ outcomes ρg which are functions of
the stationary magnetizations mg,i, see (23). To obtain these magnetizations, it suffices
to minimise the Hamiltonian H({mg,i}g,i, {aµ,±1µ,g,i}g,i) as it is also Lyapunov function for
their dynamics, remember equation (10). The technical obstacle to actual computation
consists in the quenched disorder contained in the Hamiltonian (11) due to the ran-
dom strategies aµ,±1g,i . The standard procedure to tackle this complication is the replica
method [28, 29].
To briefly depict this method, consider a system with Hamiltonian Ha(m) depen-
dent on state variable m and also on random, but quenched disorder a distributed with
probability P (a). In that setting, even the partition function Za =
∫
e−βHa(m) dm is a
random variable and so is the free energy Fa = − 1β logZa. Then, the physically relevant
quantity is the mean free energy F ≡ ∫ Fa P (a) da. To ease its computation, the repli-
cated partition function Z(n) is introduced as the central notion of this method. It is
calculated by replicating the system n-times with the same disorder a, and finally, by
taking an average over this disorder
Z(n) ≡
∫
ZnaP (a) da =
∫
e−β nFaP (a) da (25)
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As the second equality indicates, Z(n) is also a characteristic function for the random
variable Fa. Thus, for the mean free energy it holds
F = − 1
β
lim
n→0
dZ(n)
dn
(26)
However, this limiting process is only formal as we are unable to calculate Z(n) for
general n, except for positive integers. The existence and uniqueness of an analytical
continuation of Z(n) is an open question of the contemporary mathematical physics.
Full solution of the canonical MG using replica method is available [30, 31], as well
as solution of various modifications of the MG [13, 14, 23, 25, 33, 34, 35]. We apply this
method straightforwardly to our case. For the replicated partition function we obtain
formula
Z(n) =
∑
{
aµ,sg,j
}
∈
{
−1,+1
}
2PN

∫ 1
−1
e−βH({mf,i}f,i,{a
µ,±1
g,j }g,j)
∏
f,i
dmf,i


n
(27)
where the sum goes over all possible realizations of the quenched disorder. Using
Hubbard-Stratonovich transformation, we introduce auxiliary variables za ∈ R indexed
by replica index a ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Thus, we obtain the previous formula in the following
form
Z(n) =
∫ 1
−1
(∫
R
e−
1
2
∑n
a=1(z
a)2− β
2P
∑n
a,b=1 z
azb
∑
g,i I
2
g(1+m
a
g,im
b
g,i)
∏
a
dza
)P∏
a,g,i
dmag,i (28)
To compute it, it is necessary to introduce the replica-symmetric ansatz and then apply
the saddle-point method. Next, we calculate the mean free energy F using equation (26).
Finally, to achieve the formula for the minima of Hamiltonian H , it suffices to carry out
the following limit
H = lim
β→∞
F (29)
Without resorting more details of the computation, we note that at the core there is
an equation for an auxiliary quantity ζ ∈ R+ parameterized by α defined in (12)[
4ζ2I2g − 2ζ2I2g erf (ζ Ig) + erf (ζ Ig)−
2ζIg√
pi
e−ζ
2I2g
]
= α . (30)
Once ζ is found, we can calculate the order parameters
Qg = I
2
g − I2g erf (ζ Ig) +
1
2 ζ2
erf (ζ Ig)− 1√
pi
Ig
ζ
e−ζ
2I2g , (31)
the minimum value of the Hamiltonian
H =
N
2
[
Qg + I
2
g
] (
1− [ erf (ζ Ig)]
α
)2
(32)
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and hence the mutual predictability using relation (24) reads
θfg =
1
α
(
2 ζIg − ζIg erf (ζ Ig)− 1√
pi
e−ζ
2I2g
)
×
×
(
2 ζIf − ζIf erf (ζ If )− 1√
pi
e−ζ
2I2f
)
+
α− [ erf (ζ Ih)]
2α
(
2− erf (ζ If )
λf
δfg − IgIf (2− erf (ζ Ig))(2− erf (ζ If ))
[2I2h − I2h erf (ζ Ih)]
)
.
(33)
Considering equation (23), we conclude
ρg =
erf (ζ Ig)
4 ζ2 Ig
+
[ erf (ζ If )]
2α ζ
(
2ζIg − ζIg erf (ζ Ig)− 1√
pi
e−ζ
2I2g
)
− Ig . (34)
The expression (34) is the main result we shall build on further in the following sections.
Before going to that, we complete the calculations by the formula for the volatility (13)
which is
σ2 =
[
I2g
]
+
[ erf (ζ Ig)]
2
4αζ2
− [ erf (ζ Ig)]
2 ζ2
. (35)
In the following two sections, we shall analyse these results first at the critical point and
then deep in the ergodic regime.
5. Critical behaviour
For the minimization ofH the analysis of critical behaviour is crucial. The calculation
of (27) is valid only in the ergodic phase of the MG as it was already examined in Ref.
[9]. Therein, the formula for susceptibility χ is obtained which in our setting directly
generalizes to
χ =
[ erf (ζ Ig)]
α− [ erf (ζ Ig)] (36)
And it is the very fact of diverging susceptibility what characterises the critical point.
Thus, it was deduced that the ergodic phase of the MG corresponds to values α ≥ αc
with the critical value αc obtained from
αc = [ erf (ζc Ig)] (37)
with ζc given by an equation emerging from the previous equation together with (30)[
2 ζ2c I
2
g − ζ2c I2g erf (ζc Ig)−
1√
pi
ζc Ig e
−ζ2c I
2
g
]
= 0 (38)
Considering only one group of players, critical coefficient αc ≃ 0.3374 of the canonical
MG reappears. Generally, the critical value αc is equal or below this “canonical” value
for any game configuration {λg, Ig}g due to the concavity of erf (x) in (37).
In the canonical MG, the predictability vanishes at the critical point α = αc. This
observation does not hold for the mutual predictabilities θfg directly, however, it holds for
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the mean predictability θg of an arbitrary group g. To verify it, we substitute condition
(37) for αc into the definition of θg, see (20), using equation (33). The achieved equation
for θg at the critical point is directly proportional to the left side of (38) and on that
account θg does vanish here.
Another significant characterization of the critical point in the canonical MG was
related to the notion of frozen agents firstly mentioned in Ref. [39]. An agent i of group
g is called frozen if one of his strategies is significantly better than the other. Thus,
in the stationary point it holds mg,i = ±1. In the canonical MG the fraction of frozen
agents φ is maximized at the critical point and it decreases with increasing α > αc. For
the fraction of frozen agents φg within group g in the MG with heterogeneous impacts
we obtain
φg = 1− erf (ζIg) (39)
following Ref. [40]. Then, the overall fraction of frozen agents is
φ = 1− [erf (ζIg)] . (40)
From equation (30) we can see that ζ grows with increasing α. Thus, even in the MG
with heterogeneous impacts the overall ratio of frozen agents φ is maximized at α = αc
and decreases with increasing α > αc. Furhtermore, this observation holds regardless of
the actual game configuration {λg, Ig}g.
Also, the loss in the canonical MG, which is represented by volatility σ2 = −Π{I}, was
minimized at the critical point. We will show that this fact is violated in the generalized
MG. Substituting the condition (37) for αc into the formula for a group outcome ρg,
remember (15), we obtain a simplified formula at the critical point
ρg =
1
2
erf (ζcIg)
(
1
2 ζ2c Ig
− Ig
)
− 1
2 ζc
√
pi
e−ζ
2
c I
2
g (41)
We can show that ρg ≤ 0 holds for all groups g and all the possible game configurations
{λg, Ig}g as long as we are at the critical point. It implies that even the average profit
Π{U(I)} is negative here for an arbitrary utility function U(I) (which is non-negative by
definition). Nevertheless, in the next section, we will see that there exist game configu-
rations where Π{U(I)} > 0 holds for some specific utility functions away from the critical
point. The existence of positive average profits away from critical point implies that the
critical point is no more optimal for the generalized variant of the MG. However, this
observation depends on the considered utility function.
6. Two groups
Next, we examine the easiest generalisation of the canonical MG. We consider a game
consisting of two groups of agents, G = 2, and depict their co-habitation. Firstly, we fix
a scale of impacts Ig [
I2g
]
= 1. (42)
This particular choice establishes a relation to the canonical MG as
[
I2g
]
corresponds to
volatility σ2 in the game of randomly guessing agents. Thus, having this normalisation,
we work on the scale of the canonical MG. We also prefer this normalisation because the
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calculations for the game with infinitely many groups are valid only provided
[
I2g
]
<∞
[26].
In all the subsequent figures it suffices to consider impact I1 ∈ [0, 1] since the rest of
function values, i.e. those of argument I1 > 1, are determined through (42) by reversing
the groups. As for the variable λ1, we restrict ourselves to λ1 ∈ [0, 1). It is possible to
prove that αc(λ1, I1) is discontinuous along the line λ1 = 1 considering the normalisation
(42). In Fig. 1, it is clearly visible that the critical value αc(λ1, I1) is, indeed, lower or
equal to the critical value αc ≃ 0.3374 observed in the canonical MG. We picked α = 0.4
for all subsequent calculations in order to remain safely in the ergodic phase as it was
discussed in the previous section.
The principal novelty in our result is that for some game configurations {λg, Ig}g the
overall average outcome ρ = Π{1} can even be positive as depicted in Fig. 2. In other
words, the majority of agents wins in these cases. From Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 showing
separate outcomes of each group ρ1 and ρ2, respectively, we can deduce what is behind
this phenomena. To gain on average, one group has to sponge off the other. In the case
of two groups, the group with smaller impact is always winning. Its positive outcome
is not very high, in fact, but when weighted by the groups’ ratios, it can overweight
negative outcome of the other group.
In the next three figures, we plot the predictabilities θ11, θ22 and mutual predictability
θ12, see Fig. 5, Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, respectively. Note that the positiveness of the diagonal
elements of θfg is enforced by their definition, see (19). Next, we observe that θ12 is
negative for all configurations of the game. In other words, the aggregated actions Aµ1
and Aµ2 are anticorrelated for the MG consisting of two groups.
In Fig. 8, we show the volatility σ2 = −Π{I} defined by (13). The closer σ2 is to
1, the closer is the result of the game to the behaviour of randomly guessing agents.
We observe that this holds in the vicinity of λ1 = 1 and I1 = 0. In other words, the
co-adaptation of agents is poor for these game parameters. However, it is the same area
where αc falls almost to 0, confer Fig. 1. It resembles a similar feature of the canonical
MG, where σ2 grows with α receding from αc. Here, the situation is analogous. Even
though α was fixed in this set of calculations, αc is decreasing in the region of our interest
and thus the distance α− αc is growing.
The next three figures depict the fraction of frozen agents. We plot their overall
fraction φ, fraction of frozen agents within the first group φ1 and fraction of frozen
agents within the second group φ2, see Fig. 9, Fig. 10 and Fig. 11, respectively. For
higher ratio of frozen agents we observe also the higher overall outcome, compare φ with
ρ. This was valid also in the canonical MG, where frozen agents were more effective on
average.
In the last set of figures, we depict the way the overall average profit Π{U(I)} is
influenced by the particular choice of the utility function U(I). The overall average
profits Π{I
1/2} and Π{I
1/4} are depicted in Fig. 12 and Fig. 13, respectively. For the
utility function U(I) = I1/4 we append Fig. 14 and Fig. 15 depicting a separate average
profits of both groups Π
{I1/4}
1 and Π
{I1/4}
2 , respectively. Next, we add another overall
average profit Π{I/(I+1)} using a different shape of the utility function, see Fig. 16. For
all these utility functions new local maxima of Π{U(I)} appear.
Although we did not solve explicitly the problem of maximizing the agents’ utility,
we consider the calculated dependence of the average profit on impacts as a guide for a
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hypothetical choice of optimal impact. The location of the optimum depends crucially
on the form of the utility function. Therefore, the introduction of the utility function is
one of the cornerstones of our approach.
7. Conclusion
We investigated in detail the modification of the Minority Game in which the agents
act on different scales. These heterogeneous scales are implemented as agents’ impacts
and can be interpreted in different ways. Within the traffic metaphor of the MG, the
impacts corresponds to the lengths of the vehicles the agents are driving. Alternatively,
we can view it as a simplified method how to account for different frequencies at which
the agents are playing. Then, an agent’s impact is directly proportional to the inverse of
the time scale at which the agent is participating.
The agents are divided into several groups according to their impacts. The MG model
with heterogeneous impacts is solved by standard procedure using the replica trick. The
average outcome of each group was then obtained, as well as the mutual predictabilities of
the groups. To interpret properly the ensemble of outcomes for each group, we introduce
an utility function of the impact of agents. Within the traffic metaphor, utility says how
much profit can be expected having vehicle of the given length. The average profit of
individual groups is calculated from their average outcomes, with utility considered. We
discuss the overall average profit of the system for the simplest case of two groups. The
agents with lower impact are always in advantage, and the overall profit of the system
can even be positive, which means that the MG viewed from this perspective may be
a positive-sum game. This is in contrast with the usual way of measuring the losses
through the volatility which enforces that the MG is a negative-sum game.
Although we kept the traffic metaphor of the MG within this paper, we believe that
the results can be interpreted also in the language of stock markets. We argue that if we
think of the impact of an agent as the size of the capital an investor is playing with, the
relative outcome ρg is more suitable description of an agent’s profit. The real investors
do compete for highest relative rather than absolute profit. We see that in absolute
numbers the MG with heterogeneous impacts remains, of course, a negative-sum game,
but subjectively felt relative profit of agents averaged over the whole system may be
positive. This observation could give a cause for the heterogeneity of investors’ sizes,
which is one of the most fundamental features of the stock market [27]. Interpreting
the utility function U(I) as an investor’s subjective evaluation of the capital unit I, the
notion of Π{U(I)} is a tool suitable for finer analysis of this phenomena.
To sum up, by introduction diversity in the impact of agents, the average profit in the
MG, measured by an non-negative utility function, may turn the MG into a positive-sum
game, so that the diversity implies advantage for all. We can conjecture that this is the
driving mechanism which favours emergence of groups acting with different impacts. An
important question which still remains to be solved is, what would happen if each of the
agents is free in her choice of the impact. Both group sizes and group impacts would
be free to be adjusted to an optimum. The investigation of the properties of these Nash
equilibria is left to a future publication.
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Figure 1: Critical alpha αc(λ1, I1) calculated for the game of two groups (G = 2) with groups’ impacts
normalized as
[
I2g
]
= 1.
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Figure 2: The average overall outcome ρ(λ1, I1) calculated for the game of two groups (G = 2) with
α = 0.4 and groups’ impacts normalized as
[
I2g
]
= 1.
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Figure 3: The average outcome ρ1(λ1, I1) of the first group calculated for the game of two groups (G = 2)
with α = 0.4 and groups’ impacts normalized as
[
I2g
]
= 1.
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Figure 4: The average outcome ρ2(λ1, I1) of the second group calculated for the game of two groups
(G = 2) with α = 0.4 and groups’ impacts normalized as
[
I2g
]
= 1.
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Figure 5: The predictability θ11(λ1, I1) of the first group calculated for the game of two groups (G = 2)
with α = 0.4 and groups’ impacts normalized as
[
I2g
]
= 1.
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Figure 6: The predictability θ22(λ1, I1) of the second group calculated for the game of two groups
(G = 2) with α = 0.4 and groups’ impacts normalized as
[
I2g
]
= 1.
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Figure 7: The mutual predictability θ12(λ1, I1) between groups calculated for the game of two groups
(G = 2) with α = 0.4 and groups’ impacts normalized as
[
I2g
]
= 1.
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Figure 8: The volatility σ2(λ1, I1) calculated for the game of two groups (G = 2) with α = 0.4 and
groups’ impacts normalized as
[
I2g
]
= 1.
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Figure 9: The average ratio of frozen agents φ(λ1, I1) calculated for the game of two groups (G = 2)
with α = 0.4 and groups’ impacts normalized as
[
I2g
]
= 1.
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Figure 10: The ratio of frozen agents φ1(λ1, I1) within the first group calculated for the game of two
groups (G = 2) with α = 0.4 and groups’ impacts normalized as
[
I2g
]
= 1.
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Figure 11: The ratio of frozen agents φ2(λ1, I1) within the second group calculated for the game of two
groups (G = 2) with α = 0.4 and groups’ impacts normalized as
[
I2g
]
= 1.
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Figure 12: The average overall profit Π{I
1/2}(λ1, I1) calculated for the game of two groups (G = 2) with
α = 0.4 and groups’ impacts normalized as
[
I2g
]
= 1.
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Figure 13: The average overall profit Π{I
1/4}(λ1, I1) calculated for the game of two groups (G = 2) with
α = 0.4 and groups’ impacts normalized as
[
I2g
]
= 1.
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Figure 14: The average profit Π
{I1/4}
1 (λ1, I1) of the first group calculated for the game of two groups
(G = 2) with α = 0.4 and groups’ impacts normalized as
[
I2g
]
= 1.
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Figure 15: The average profit Π
{I1/4}
2 (λ1, I1) of the second group calculated for the game of two groups
(G = 2) with α = 0.4 and groups’ impacts normalized as
[
I2g
]
= 1.
0
0.5
1
0
0.5
1
−0.2
−0.1
0
I1λ1
Π
{I/(
I+1
)}
Figure 16: The average overall profit Π{I/(I+1)}(λ1, I1) calculated for the game of two groups (G = 2)
with α = 0.4 and groups’ impacts normalized as
[
I2g
]
= 1.
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